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Abstract
The \hot stove e®ect" has been studied for repeated-play decision making
under uncertainty (also referred to as experience-based decision making) in
which the decision makers repeatedly face the Allais-type binary choice prob-
lems, and have to learn about the outcome distributions through sampling
as the decision makers are not explicitly provided with prior information
on the payo® structure. The previous studies have found mixed evidence:
some studies have found that the hot stove e®ect is strong in repeated-play
decision making under uncertainty, while other studies have found that the
e®ect is weak. Thus, the evidence is inconsistent. This paper reports an
experimental investigation of the hot stove e®ect in repeated-play decision
making under ambiguity. The current experiment involves an ambiguity
treatment in which (1) the participants perform two binary repeated-play
choice problems, each involving 400-fold choice between a risky option and
a riskless option; and (2) in each problem, there are two states of nature
available: a favourable state and an unfavourable state, but only one of
them obtains on any given trial. The realisation of the actual state is not
disclosed to the participants, thus they would be expected to discover the
actual state through sampling with immediate feedback. The current results
suggest that the magnitude of the hot stove e®ect is signi¯cantly di®erent
between repeated-play decision making under uncertainty and repeated-play
decision making under ambiguity. I shall show that the hot stove e®ect is
attenuated in repeated-play decision making under ambiguity.
We are living in an uncertain and ambiguous world, and facing decision making under uncer-
tainty and ambiguity. Many popular de¯nitions of \ambiguity" have been introduced (e.g.,
Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; Klibano®, Marinacci, & Mukerji, 2005; Mukerji, 1998; Mukerji
& Tallon, 2001, 2003, 2004). This paper obeys the de¯nition employed in Einhorn and Hog-
arth (1986) and Mukerji (1998): Ambiguity is an intermediate state between uncertainty
(i.e., people receive no information to rule out any probability distribution possibilities) and
risk (i.e., people receive one de¯ned probability distribution).
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2Ambiguity or \uncertainty about uncertainties" is a pervasive element of much real
world decision making (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986). An example of our real world decision
making includes investment behaviour. Traders and investors often face the complexity
of the situation and ambiguity in asset markets. Traders and investors do not often have
perfect, prior information about asset markets, but ambiguous information about them.
An example is concerned with investors who face a choice between a safe asset (e.g., cash)
and a risky asset with an unknown return distribution. The distribution is unknown,
but the investors know that the distribution obtains either a favourable distribution or an
unfavourable distribution. If they consider the favourable distribution to be possible, then
they may choose to invest in the risky asset. If, on the other hand, they consider the
unfavourable distribution to be possible, then they consider not to invest in the risky asset
(Easley & O'Hara, 2005).
This paper reports the \hot stove e®ect" in repeated-play decision making under
ambiguity. The hot stove e®ect may push the traders and investors into trouble if they gen-
eralise from experience. An application of the hot stove e®ect to behavioural ¯nance implies
that repeated experience often leads the traders and investors to deviate from maximisation.
The hot stove e®ect was ¯rst introduced by Mark Twain with his observation that if a cat
jumped on a hot stove, then she would never jump on a hot stove again. However, the cat
would never jump even on a cold stove. Coutu (2006) stated that the hot stove e®ect is
a fundamental problem of learning that reduces the decision makers' (DMs') likelihood of
repeating decisions that got them in trouble. Munichor, Erev, and Lotem (2006) provided
the explanation on the hot stove e®ect that bad experience decreases the tendency to select
the same alternative, even though it is a preferable alternative (i.e., an alternative with
higher expected value). The hot stove e®ect implies a bias against a risky alternative in
binary experience-based decisions (Denrell & March, 2001). The bias is a product of the
tendency to reproduce actions that have been successful and avoid recent actions that have
led to poor outcomes.
This paper aims to examine to what extent the hot stove e®ect persists in repeated-
play decision making under ambiguity. For this aim, I implemented the current experiment
that involved an ambiguity treatment in which (1) the participants performed two binary
repeated-play choice problems, each involving 400-fold choice between a risky option and
a riskless option; and (2) in each problem, there were two states of nature available: a
favourable state and an unfavourable state, but only one of them obtained on any given
trial. The current results suggest that the hot stove e®ect is attenuated in repeated-play
decision making under ambiguity.
Previous research on repeated-play decision making under uncertainty, also referred
to as \experience-based" decision making, has led to mixed conclusions with regard to the
descriptive value of the hot stove e®ect. Whereas some studies (e.g., Denrell & March, 2001)
demonstrated its importance, other studies (e.g., Barron & Erev, 2003; Erev & Barron,
2005) suggested that this e®ect is weak. Recently (Fujikawa, 2009), I accounted for the
existence of the hot stove e®ect in repeated-play decision making under uncertainty. Below,
we revisit the experiment in Fujikawa (2009).
3Table 1: Choice problems in Fujikawa (2009). PA (PB) is % of A (B) choices over 400 rounds.
Problem A PA B PB
1a (N=42) 4, 0.8 48% 3, 1 52%
2a (N=42) 32, 0.1 22% 3, 1 78%
The hot stove e®ect in repeated-play decision making under
uncertainty
In repeated-play decision making under uncertainty, the DMs have to learn about
the outcome distributions through sampling, as they are not explicitly provided with prior
information on the payo® structure. Previous and recent studies (e.g., Barron & Erev, 2003;
Erev & Barron, 2005; Fox & Hadar, 2006; Hau, Pleskac, Kiefer, & Hertwig, 2008; Fujikawa,
2009) reported behavioural tendencies in repeated-play decision making under uncertainty.
Fujikawa (2009) presented an experiment that involved two choice problems (Problem
1a and 2a). Table 1 shows the payo® structure of each problem. For example, one selection
of A in Problem 1a made the participants earn four points with probability 0.8 and zero
point otherwise. Each problem included 400-fold binary choice between A (a risky alterna-
tive) and B (a riskless alternative). The participants' goal in each trial t (t = 1; : : : ; 400)
was to select (click on) one of the two unmarked buttons that appeared on the computer
screen. Each click resulted with an immediate payo® (random draw from the payo® distri-
bution associated with the selected button). Thus, the prior information was minimalistic,
and the participants had to base their decisions on experience. Table 1 shows the overall
maximisation rate (the overall proportion of A choices) in each problem: for example, the
overall maximisation rate was 0.48 in Problem 1a.
Notice that in Problem 1a the worst outcome (0 from A) is also the rare outcome
(probability of 0.2). In Problem 1a, reliance on small samples and the hot stove e®ect lead to
contradicting predictions. Reliance on small samples implies that the rare outcome (0 from
A) will be underweighted : this prediction implies that A will be preferred. The hot stove
e®ect predicts the participants' learning that reduces their likelihood of repeating decisions,
with which they have done poorly (i.e., getting burned on a hot stove in Twain's example,
and thus referring to earning the worst outcome from A). Therefore, the hot stove e®ect
implies that the worst outcome (0 from A) will be overweighted : this prediction implies
that B will be preferred.
Denrell and March (2001) documented that the hot stove e®ect implies a bias against
a risky alternative in experience-based decisions (i.e., repeated-play decision making under
uncertainty), and the bias is a product of the tendency to reproduce actions that have been
successful and avoid actions that led to loss. Thus, the hot stove e®ect implies a bias toward
B (the safe and low variability option) in Problem 1a and 2a. One explains that low payo®s
from A reduce the probability of additional A choices, and for that reason their e®ect of
the estimated value from A is large. In an extreme case, a sequence of two \0" outcomes
in Problem 2a can eliminate additional A choices and keep the participants' estimate that
A yields only \0" outcomes.
In Fujikawa (2009), I implemented Problem 1a and 2a to examine to what extent
4the hot stove e®ect could mediate behavioural tendencies in repeated-play decision making
under uncertainty. In Problem 1a, the hot stove e®ect implies more B choices, while reliance
on small samples (and thus the e®ect of underweighting of rare outcomes) leads to the
prediction that implies more A choices. Central to this prediction is the supposition that
A provides better payo® (4 vs. 3) in most of trials (80%). I observed almost 50% A
choices in Problem 1a: it seems that the two e®ects (the hot stove e®ect and the e®ect
of underweighting of rare outcomes) cancelled each other, and the maximisation rate was
close to 50%. In Problem 2a, reliance on small samples | that causes underweighting of
the attractive rare outcome (32 from A) | leads to the same prediction as the hot stove
e®ect: it implies more B choices. Almost 20% A choices were observed in Problem 2a. This
observation suggests the signi¯cant consequence of the hot stove e®ect in repeated-play
decision making under uncertainty.
The hot stove e®ect in repeated-play decision making under
ambiguity
Repeated-play decision making under uncertainty has been discussed in previous stud-
ies on experience-based decisions, where the participants made repeated choices under un-
certainty (i.e., choices with unknown outcome distributions). That is, the participants
received no prior information to rule out any outcome distribution possibilities. On the
contrary, this paper presents the current experiment in which the participants made re-
peated choices under ambiguity.
Experiment. The current experiment was conducted at the Kyoto Experimental Eco-
nomics Laboratory (KEEL) in Japan with 33 paid participants | undergraduates from
various faculties at Kyoto Sangyo University. On their arrival at the KEEL, each partici-
pant was assigned a workstation that displayed an experimental screen, and distributed a
written instruction of the experiment. The instruction was read aloud and the participants
were given an opportunity to ask questions individually.
The participants engaged in the following Problem 1b and 2b:
Problem 1b
State A: Choose between L: (4, 0.8) and R: (3, 1).
State B: Choose between L: (4, 0.7) and R: (3, 1).
Problem 2b
State A: Choose between L: (32, 0.1) and R: (3, 1).
State B: Choose between L: (32, 0.05) and R: (3, 1).
Each problem consisted of 400 rounds. The participants engaged in Problem 1b and 2b in
order. At the beginning of each problem, they were presented with two equally likely states
of the world: a priori relatively high state and a priori relatively low state. Undisclosed
to the participants, in both problems, State A (a priori relatively high state) was set to
be an actual state of the world, and State B (a priori relatively low state) was set to be
a dummy state. They were not disclosed which of the two states of the world was being
realised in each problem, but were disclosed that the same state of the world was being
5Figure 1. A computerised money machine
realised across the problem. The participants would be expected, through sampling with
feedback, to discover which of the two states of the world was actually being realised in
each problem.
In each problem, the participants were instructed to operate a \computerised money
machine" shown in Figure 1. Their basic task at each round t (t = 1; : : : ; 400) was a binary
choice between L and R in each problem. They made a choice between the two buttons on
a computer screen to which each participant was assigned. In each trial, the participants
were asked to click on one of the two buttons. Each click led to a random draw from the
outcome distribution associated with the selected button. They started with Problem 1b
and made 400 selections in Problem 1b. Then, they were prompted to move to Problem
2b by the automatically-generated message on the computer screen on their completion of
Problem 1b. Hence, they were aware when a change from Problem 1b to Problem 2b was
generated; that is, on their completion of Problem 1b, they were advised that Problem
1b had been completed and they moved on Problem 2b. The money machine provided
the participants with binary types of feedback immediately following each choice: (1) the
payo® for the button chosen that appeared on the screen for the duration of one second
and; (2) an update of an accumulating payo® counter, which was constantly displayed. At
the conclusion of the experiment, the participants were paid individually and privately at a
6conversion rate of one point to 0.3 Yen (about 0.25 US cent at the time of the experiment),
and received no initial (showing up) fee.
0
0 . 1
0 . 2
0 . 3
0 . 4
0 . 5
0 . 6
5 0 1 0 0 1 5 0 2 0 0 2 5 0 3 0 0 3 5 0 4 0 0
T r i a l s
P r o b l e m 1 b P r o b l e m 2 b
Figure 2. The maximisation rate in blocks of 50 rounds.
Results and Discussion
The overall maximisation rate (i.e., the proportion of L choices) is 0.53 and 0.46 in
Problem 1b and 2b, respectively. It follows that L, for example, was chosen on average 212
out of 400 times in Problem 1b. The maximisation rate in Problem 1b is signi¯cantly larger
(p = 0:0000) than in Problem 2b. Figure 2 illustrates the maximisation rate in blocks of 50
rounds. Table 2 shows a comparison between the maximisation rate observed in Fujikawa
(2009) and that in the current experiment. The maximisation rate in the current experiment
(i.e., the maximisation rate in Problem 1b and 2b) is signi¯cantly larger (p = 0:0000) than
the maximisation rate in Fujikawa (2009) (i.e., the maximisation rate in Problem 1a and
2b).
7Table 2: The overall maximisation rate in the current and previous experiments. The left-hand
(right-hand) column presents the maximisation rate in Problem 1a (2a) in Fujikawa (2009) and in
Problem 1b (2b) in the current experiment.
Risky: (4, 0.8) Risky: (32, 0.1)
Safe: (3, 1) Safe: (3, 1)
Fujikawa (2009) 48% 22%
(N=42)
Current experiment 53% 46%
(N=33)
It can be seen that the attenuated hot stove e®ect and strong reliance on small sam-
ples can well explain behavioural tendencies in repeated-play decision making under ambi-
guity. This section presents the two-fold ¯nding: (1) the hot stove e®ect gets attenuated in
repeated-play decision making under ambiguity (the current experiment); and (2) reliance
on small samples is strong in repeated-play decision making under ambiguity (the current
experiment). To show the ¯nding, I performed the comparison of the results of Problem 1a
and 1b, and the comparison of the results of Problem 2a and 2b.
The hot stove e®ect implies more B and R choices in Problem 1a and 1b, respectively;
while reliance on small samples (and thus the e®ect of underweighting of rare outcomes)
leads to the prediction, implying more A and L choices, as A and L provide better payo® (4
vs. 3) in most of trials (80%). Fujikawa's (2009) results indicated less than 50% A choices
in Problem 1a, implying the strong hot stove e®ect in repeated-play decision making under
uncertainty. On the other hand, the current results indicate more than 50% L choices in
Problem 1b, implying the attenuated hot stove e®ect and strong reliance on small samples
in repeated-play decision making under ambiguity.
Both reliance on small samples and the hot stove e®ect lead to the same predictions,
implying more B and R choices in Problem 2a and 2b, respectively. Fujikawa (2009) revealed
strong reliance on small samples (underweighting of the rare outcome) and the hot stove
e®ect in Problem 2a. On the contrary, the current results of Problem 2b suggest that, when
the DMs engage in repeated-play decision making under ambiguity, they exhibit strong
reliance on small samples and the attenuated hot stove e®ect, resulting the higher choice
rate of the risky alternative than when the DMs engage in repeated-play decision making
under uncertainty.
Concluding remarks
Previous studies on repeated-play decision making under uncertainty, also referred
to as experience-based decision making, have led to mixed conclusions with regards to
the descriptive value of the hot stove e®ect. Some (Denrell & March, 2001; Fujikawa,
2009) demonstrated its importance. Others (Barron & Erev, 2003; Erev & Barron, 2005)
suggested that the e®ect is weak.
This paper aimed at examining to what extent the hot stove e®ect would persist in
repeated-play decision making under ambiguity, implementing the current experiment that
8involved the Allais-type binary choice problems. For this aim, I reviewed my recent work
(Fujikawa, 2009) on repeated-play decision making under uncertainty. The comparison of its
results to the current results reveals that the hot stove e®ect is attenuated in repeated-play
decision making under ambiguity.
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